Proposal for a research using law and economics methodology

The proposed study seeks to explore the interplay between budget transparency and legislative budgetary oversight in Egypt, with a focus on the role of the Egyptian Parliament during the various stages of the budget process—drafting, approval, execution, and auditing. By analyzing Egypt's budgetary framework as outlined in the Constitution and Law No. 53 of 1973, the research will investigate how Parliament's oversight impacts transparency and public accountability, particularly during pivotal historical events such as the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The study aims to bridge the gap in existing literature by examining the Egyptian context, using tools like the Open Budget Index (OBI) and descriptive analysis to measure the correlation between legislative oversight and transparency.

Grounded in agency theory, the study posits that Parliament, as an intermediary between citizens and the government, plays a critical role in mitigating information asymmetry and ensuring fiscal accountability. By addressing key phenomena such as the "agency problem" and the "common pool" issue, the research will evaluate the effectiveness of legislative checks and balances in enhancing budget transparency. Additionally, it will assess whether current laws and practices adequately address the principal-agent dynamic and the influence of interest groups, offering insights into improving fiscal governance in Egypt.